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Abstract 
This article presents a Continuous-Time Markov Chain model to characterise the 
propagation of failures in optical GMPLS rings. In order to characterize the behaviour 
of failure propagation epidemic-based models are commonly used. However, the 
existing epidemic models do not take into account the specific features of a multilayer 
network environment. A node failure in GMPLS-based networks can affect: Control 
Plane and Data plane reporting different failures scenarios. Consequently, an extended 
generic epidemic model called SID is proposed, in order to cover multiple failures and 
recovered states in a GMPLS Multilayer scenario. The CTMC model takes into account 
the SID model and provides a set of design rules to specify the values of repair rates 
required to achieve a given service availability, assuming a certain infection and disable 
rate. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK 
Network reliability and failure resilience has become a major concern for Internet 
Service Providers and Operators. Indeed, network operators often seek ways to provide 
the so-called five-nine-reliability level, that is, devising the mechanisms to guarantee 
that their networks are 99.999% of the time fully operational [1]. Most models consider 
that network failures occur independently from one another, for instance a fibre cut or 
node malfunctioning, as isolated events and never related. However, there is a gap in the 
literature when considering environments at which network malfunctioning propagates 
across a given topology network. This is typical from virus/worms attacks or due to 
natural disasters. 
 
In such case, epidemic models can be used to characterise the dynamics of failures 
that spread from a single node to the rest of the network. The concept of Epidemic 
Networks (EN) is a general term that describes how an epidemic evolves on a set of 
individuals during a certain amount of time. The rise and decline of an epidemic may be 
probabilistically characterised, and definitely depends upon the infection propagation 
rate and node connection degree [2]. Research in this area involves the study of 
different aspects, including how the epidemic evolves over time or how to immunise 
part of the population in order to minimise and control the epidemic propagation and 
effects. Examples of networking applications where EN models may apply include 
power supply networks, social networks, neural networks or computer networks. 
 
The research community has proposed a large number of epidemic models, mainly 
focused on characterising the propagation of viruses in biological systems. There are 
several families described in the literature dealing with models of virus propagation [3]. 
The first family, called the Susceptible-Infected (SI) considers individuals as being 
either susceptible (S) or infected (I). This family assumes that the infected individuals 
will remain infected forever and, so, it can be used as a “worst case propagation” 
scenario. A less-pessimistic family is the Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) group, 
which considers that a susceptible individual that became infected on contact with 
another infected one may then recover with some likelihood. Therefore, individuals may 
change their state from susceptible to infected, and vice versa, several times. The third 
family is the Susceptible-Infected-Removed (SIR), which extends the SI model to take 
into account the removed state. In the SIR group, an individual can be infected just once 
because, when the infected individual recovers, it becomes immune and will no longer 
pass the infection onto others. Finally there are two families that extend the SIR family: 
SIDR (Susceptible Infected Detected Removed) and SIRS (Susceptible Infected 
Removed Susceptible). The first one adds a Detected (D) state, and is used to study the 
virus throttling, that is, an automatic mechanism for slowing down the spread of 
diseases. The second one considers that, after an individual becomes removed, it 
remains in that state for a specific period of time, and then goes back to the susceptible 
state. 
 
In the case of optical GMPLS-based transport networks, failures may occur in either 
the control and/or data planes, or in both of them. The former characterises the case at 
which control functionality becomes unavailable, and the later refers to malfunctioning 
that also affects packet-forwarding services. Previous work by the authors [4] 
introduced a new epidemic model called SID (Susceptible, Infected, and Disabled) 
where a given node may be in any of the following three states: The Susceptible state 
(both control and data plane are fully functional), the Infected state (when the control 
plane becomes infected, and may infect other neighbouring nodes) and the Disabled 
state (if both control and data planes are down). This article formulates the failure 
propagation across a GMPLS ring as a Continuous-Time Markov Chain (CTMC), and 
sets the formulation grounds towards its performance characterisation. 
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Fig. 1A. GMPLS router architecture: The 
Control and Data planes 
 
Fig. 1B. State-transition diagram for the SID 
model 
 
 
The remainder of this work is thus organised as follows: In section 2, GMPLS-based 
network failures are explained. Section 3, introduces the SID model. Section 4 presents 
the error propagation model and its formulation using CTMC concepts. Then, section 5 
depicts some numerical results as an example applied on a four-node ring. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes this work reviewing its main contributions and findings. 
2. FAILURES IN GMPLS NETWORKS 
Usually, when GMPLS networks are considered (i.e. optical networks), it is possible 
to distinguish two different parts in every node. On one hand, there is a control plane 
that runs the control and management software such as routing protocols, signaling 
protocols, etc. On the other hand, there is a data plane that is dedicated mainly to 
forwarding user data. In other words, control plane messages and data plane packets 
could even be isolated (not sharing the same transmission medium) and even have a 
different topology [5]. In such scenarios (see Fig. 1A) it is possible that some attack or 
failure could occur that affects only the control plane. If this is the case, then the routing 
and signalling procedures do not work appropriately, meaning that it is not possible to 
establish new connections. However, it is possible that the existing configuration before 
the failure in the data plane could be maintained and current established connections are 
not dropped, i.e. the data plane continues working properly. 
 
If a virus attacks one node or there is a bad software configuration, it can happen that 
only a specific function in the control plain fails. For instance, if the signalling module 
fails but the routing module is still working, new connections cannot be established 
through that node, and existing connections cannot be removed. In that case, if a fast 
recovery is not possible, the routing module can be used for advertising “no free 
capacity available”, in order to avoid having new connection attempts through the failed 
node. On the contrary, if the routing module fails and the signalling module is still 
working, the node is still able to process new connection requests and tear down 
existing connections. In this case, changes in the local state (e.g. capacity being 
allocated/released) will not be advertised until the routing process is recovered, so other 
nodes will be working with out-of-date information. In this paper it is assumed that a 
control plane failure always involves both signalling and routing modules, so as to 
reduce the number of failure scenarios. 
 
In order to recover the functionality of a failed control plane without disruption of the 
ongoing connections in the data plane, it is necessary to recover the control plane as 
soon as possible and re-synchronize the control plane state with the data plane state. 
This is not easy to accomplish and may take some time due to a first stage of 
reinstalling or rebooting the control plane and the necessary procedures and protocol 
messages for that re-synchronization [6]. It is also necessary that nodes implement re-
synchronization mechanisms like Non Stop Forwarding (NSF) and Graceful Restart 
(GR). It could also happen that, some time after the control plane failure, the data plane 
also fails causing a complete node failure and a disruption of the established 
connections through that node. 
3. ON THE PROPAGATION OF ERRORS IN GMPLS OPTICAL 
RINGS 
This section explains how errors propagate along a GMPLS network following the 
SID model and the notation to describe it. Only node failures are considered (link errors 
are not possible in this model). Figure 1A shows the generic architecture of a GMPLS 
switch. 
 
Under the assumptions of the SID model, every node in the ring may be in either one 
of the following states: 
• The “S” state, which stands for "susceptible state". In this state, both the 
control planes and the forwarding planes of the GMPLS node operate properly, hence 
the node is susceptible of becoming infected if one of its neighbours is already infected. 
Additionally, the node may fail spontaneously, which means that the node is originating 
a new infection.  
• The “I” state stands for “infected state”. In this case, the control plane of this 
GMPLS-based node fails. In that case, this node is not able to create new LSPs nor it 
may modify the current configuration of its LSPs. However, the node may still forward 
traffic from its current configuration since its forwarding plane is still operational. 
When the node is in the I state, it may propagate errors to its neighbours. 
• The “D” state, which stands for “disabled state”. In this case, both the control 
and forwarding planes are not operational. We consider that a disabled node may still 
propagate errors to adjacent nodes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1B shows the state-transition diagram for the SID model (Susceptible, 
Infected and Disabled), where a given node may be in any of the three previous states. 
The values near the arrows refer to the transition rates between states on a node. 
 
Essentially, Figure 1B states that a node susceptible to be infected (a node that is 
working properly, i.e. on state S) becomes infected at rate β (if there exists at least one 
node already infected). An infected node may become again operational (S state) or 
disabled (D state). The first case occurs at rate δ, which is the rate at which the network 
administrator fixes the problem, whereas the second case occurs at rate c. The network 
operator may also repair disabled nodes at rate t. Finally, βF refers to the spontaneous 
failure rate at which a given node in the network, whose neighbours are not infected, 
may actually become infected (spontaneously). Table I summarises all model 
parameters. 
4. MODELLING A GMPLS RING: EXAMPLE WITH FOUR 
NODES 
Figure 2 shows a four-node GMPLS ring network. To build the CTMC model, it is 
important to remark that failure propagation occurs only between adjacent nodes. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 2.  The four-node GMPLS-based ring example 
 
In light of this, Figure 3 shows the complete state transition-rate diagram of a CTMC 
model for this particular case of a four-node ring. Each state is labelled with the triple 
(NS:NI:ND), where NS refers to the number of nodes in the S state, NI denotes the 
number of nodes in state I, and ND gives the number of nodes in the S state. In this 
Table I. Summary of failure and repair rates 
Parameter Description 
βF Spontaneous infection rate 
β Infection propagation rate 
c Disabling rate 
δ Control plane repairing rate 
t Repairing rate of disabled nodes 
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example of ring topology, the states identification labels could take values from the set 
0≤{NS,NI,ND}≤4, while satisfying the constraint: NS+NI+ND=4 for every state. 
 
Clearly, the CTMC starts on state (4:0:0), which means that the four nodes are fully 
operational and no nodes are infected or disabled. The first transition to state (3:1:0) 
occurs with rate 4βF and takes into account the fact that any of the four nodes become 
infected spontaneously. The rate is 4βF to take into account the fact that this occurs at 
four times the rate of a single failure, since we have four nodes susceptible of failure. 
This is the minimum of four exponentially distributed random variables with rate βF. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. State transition-rate diagram for a four-node GMPLS ring 
 
 
Table  II. Infinitesimal generation matrix for a 4-nodes ring (Q4) 
 
Q4 4:0:0 3:1:0 3:0:1 2:2:0 2:1:1 2:0:2 1:3:0 1:2:1 1:1:2 1:0:3 0:4:0 0:3:1 0:2:2 0:1:3 0:0:4 
4:0:0  4βF              
3:1:0 δ  c 2β            
3:0:1 T    2β           
2:2:0  2δ   2c  2β         
2:1:1  t δ   c  2β        
2:0:2   2t      2β       
1:3:0    2δ    3c   2β     
1:2:1    t 2δ    2c   2β    
1:1:2     2t δ    c   2β   
1:0:3      3t        2β  
0:4:0       2δ     4c    
0:3:1       t 2δ     3c   
0:2:2        2t 2δ     2c  
0:1:3         3t δ     c 
0:0:4          4t      
 
On state (3:1:0), the CTMC may jump to three possible states: firstly, it may jump 
back to state (4:0:0) if the infected node is repaired (this occurs with rate δ); secondly, 
€ 
Pi qi = qijPj
j ∈C
∑ for i∈C
€ 
Pj
j ∈C
∑ =1
€ 
P(NS = NS*) = Pj
j ∈ C \NS =NS*{ }
∑
€ 
P(NI = NI*) = Pdiag NSN I*ND( ) = Pj
j ∈ C \N I =N I*{ }
∑
€ 
P(ND = ND* ) = Prow NSN I ND*( ) = Pj
j ∈ C \ND =ND*{ }
∑
the Chain may jump to state (3:0:1) if the infected node becomes disabled (this occurs 
with rate c); and thirdly, the Chain may jump to state (2:2:0) if the infected node 
propagates its control plane misbehaviour to one of its neighbour (this occurs with rate 
2β because it has two neighbours). It is worth remarking that β>>βF, hence once a 
given node is infected, the probability to have spontaneous infections is very small 
compared to infection propagation.  
 
In summary, the CTMC is characterised by the 15-state transition-rate diagram of 
Figure 3. Additionally, Table II summarises the transition matrix for the four-node ring, 
which can be used to generate the infinitesimal generator matrix for this CTMC, namely 
Q4. The empty gaps are assumed zero and the diagonal must equal minus the sum of 
rates along its row. 
     
With Q4, the steady-state solution for this CTMC requires solving Pi from the 
following set of equations: 
 
       (1)  
  
   where              (2), and                   (3)
 
 
 
Here, Pi denotes the steady-state probability of state i, C refers to the state space and 
qij is the transition rate from state i to state j given by the infinitesimal generator matrix 
QN. The values of Pi give the amount of time that, in the long run, the CTMC stays on 
every state. It is also interesting to study the probability of certain sets of states, 
basically, sets of states with a given number of nodes on states S, I or D, as desired. For 
instance, the probability to have exactly NS* nodes susceptible of infection is: 
 
        (4) 
 
which just comprises the sum of steady-state probabilities of states (NS*:*:*).From 
Figure 3, it is easy to observe that this value is the sum of probabilities over the NS*-th 
column, and we shall refer to this column as . For example,  denotes the probability to 
find the network with exactly three susceptible nodes regardless of the existing number 
of infected and disabled nodes. In light of this, it is also easy to compute the steady-state 
probability to find the network with a certain number of infected (NI) or disabled (ND) 
nodes, again after summing some probability values: 
 
                                                                   (5) 
 
                                                                    (6) 
 
This just requires summing the steady-state probabilities of a given diagonal or row 
in the state-transition rate diagram of Figure 3. 
5. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
Table III shows an example of transition rates following reference [7]. 
€ 
qi = qij
j ∈C
∑
 
Table III. Model parameters chosen in normalized units (occurrences/time units) 
 
Rate
s 4-nodes 100-nodes 
βF 0.01 0.0085 
β 0.1 0.085 
c 0.1 0.1 
δ 0.07 0.05 
t 5 5 
 
After solving the steady-state probabilities of the CTMC-based model, it is easy to 
show the percentage of time that the ring stays in every state as a function of the two 
repairing rates: the rate δ at which the control plane of a node is repaired (this is, 
transition rate from the Infected state to the Susceptible state of a node) and the rate t at 
which nodes are fully repaired (transition rate from the Disabled state to the Susceptible 
state).  
 
We have summarised the results in Figures 4, 5 and 6, where different Pcol, Pdiag 
and Prow are shown. In the first plot of Figure 4, we show the steady-state probability 
of having each possible number of nodes in the up (i.e., susceptible) state for different 
values of δ and t. Clearly, node failure becomes less likely the larger the value of δ (for 
a given value of t). As shown, for δ=0.15, the value oft which makes Pcol (4:I:D) 
approximate unity is t>0.1. However, when δ=1.5, the disabled node repairing rate must 
be t>0.01. The conclusion from this experiment is that, when the infected repair rate δ is 
small, the repair rate of disabled nodes must be greater to compensate this. On the other 
hand, when δ is large, the value of t does not necessarily have to be that large to achieve 
Pcol (4:I:D) approximate unity. 
 
Figure 5 and 6 show a similar set of results for Pdiag and Prow respectively. It 
should be pointed out that Pdiag refers to the cumulated probability to find the ring with 
a given number of infected nodes and Prow gives the cumulated probability to find a 
given number of disabled nodes.  
 
Figure 5 shows that for δ>0.15, the probability to find Infected nodes is very small 
(regardless of the value of t). Figure 6 shows that it is required to have t>0.1 to have no 
disabled nodes with large probability (close to unity) regardless of δ. 
 
In conclusion, for the failure rate parameters of Table II, a value of δ>0.15 and of 
t>0.1 is sufficient to have all nodes in the susceptible state with large probability (close 
to unity). When δ<0.15, the values of Pdiag show that more infected nodes are likely to 
occur. On the other hand, as expected, when t<0.1, then it is the number of disabled 
nodes which becomes more likely to occur. 
 
Plots are also helpful to determine the values of δ and t required to achieve a certain 
node availability level, for a given set of infection and disable rates β and c. 
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Fig. 4. Steady-state Probabilities for the same number of susceptible nodes (Pcol) existing in the 
network for different values of δ and t. 
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Fig. 5. Stationary Probabilities for the same number of infected nodes (Pdiag) existing in the 
network for different values of δ and t. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Stationary Probabilities for the same number of disabled nodes (Prow) 
existing in the network for different values ofδ and t. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This work has presented a CTMC model to characterise the transient behaviour and 
possible states of a GMPLS-based network with ring topology whose nodes may 
become infected or disabled following the SID failure propagation model. A full 
numerical example has been presented, analyzing the resulting steady-state probabilities 
for a selected number of δ and t on a four-node ring.  
 
The presented CTMC model can help network operators in finding the required 
service repair rates of control and data planes to attain a certain level of availability. 
Additionally, it can be use for studying the sensitivity of the network to different 
combinations of failure and repair rates, in terms of the expected number of nodes in 
each state (susceptible, infected or disabled). 
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